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A Review of Yasheng Huang’s Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics: Entrepreneurship and the 
State (Cambridge University Press, 2008) 
 
By Eric Setzekorn 
With China’s export-centered economy looking increasingly unbalanced and unsustainable, there has 
been growing public support for state involvement in the interests of rural development.Yasheng 
Huang, of MIT’s Sloan School of Management, provides a powerful economic rationale to this emerging 
movement with his new book Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics. Huang argues that urban biased 
government policies over the past fifteen years are the cause of skewed proportions of China’s 
economy and have tremendously hindered stable private sector growth. Huang debunks the 
consensus view that China’s economy has become increasingly open to private enterprise during the 
thirty year of the reform period, suggesting an alternative narrative of a resurgent state sector 
sidelining the vibrant, sustainable and equitable development pattern of the 1980s. 
Huang centers his analysis of China’s reform period on the often neglected rural economy of the 
1980s, a period he dubs the “The Entrepreneurial Decade.” To Huang, the 80s pattern of rural 
development of private sector labor intensive production offered the possibility of a “virtuous” 
development based on a trajectory commonly seen in other East Asian developing nations. The 
beating heart of this decade’s growth is the dynamic role played by the Township and Village 
Enterprises (TVE), which provide both mass employment and management opportunities for poor but 
entrepreneurial residents. To get TVEs off the ground, aspiring entrepreneurs either pooled capital 
informally or were able to access official sources due to lenient credit policies encouraged by senior 
party leadership. 
In contrast to many observers, of which Huang singles out Joseph Stiglitz as the main offender, these 
organizations are shown to be functionally private operations cloaking themselves in the necessary 
legal fiction that they are collective entities in order to register with the government. One of the 
recurring themes of the book is the extent to which foreign observers continue to grossly 
misunderstand cultural and administrative terminology and functional differences between China and 
other nations, in this case misunderstanding TVEs as an organizational identifier rather than merely 
denoting locality. 
To work around the criticism that weak property rights and government policies were still relatively 
unfriendly to private capitalism in the 1980s Huang articulates the notion of “Directional Liberalism.” 
This term encapsulates his contention that faith in property rights and recognition of profits are 
relative concepts, and that, although the business environment in China in the 1980s was nowhere 
near the standard of the Washington Consensus, incremental positive changes were nevertheless 
sufficient to encourage hard work and risk-taking by rural individuals when judged from a pre-1978 
perspective. The representative Horatio Alger figure in Huang’s narrative of this period is Nian 
Guangjiu, a rural entrepreneur who successfully brands his sunflower seeds as “Idiot Seeds” and 
quickly expands from four workers in Anhui to hundreds of employees distributing seeds across China. 
In 1989, Nian Guangjiu was arrested on vague charges of hooliganism and immoral relationships 
during the post-Tiananmen crackdown, and like Nian the initial, balanced stage of China’s reform 
development came to an end and the urban-centric 1990s began. 
Where the story of the 1980s was fundamentally about the rural private-sector, the following decade 
was dominated by a shift to capital-intensive, state-directed urban development described in the 
chapter titled “The Great Reversal.” It is in the analysis of the 1990s where Huang significantly 
deviates from conventional narratives of China’s private sector growth, which focus on the private 
sector’s increasing share of output rather than his preferred method: using measures of capital inputs 
to determine the policy environment. Per Huang’s interpretation, fears that the economy is moving 
outside the control of the party’s leadership led the state to increase its role in the setting of 
investment priorities, for example by shoring up SOEs, building urban infrastructure, and initiating 
national prestige projects. 
This policy shift reflected the post-1989 leadership transition, which saw pragmatic, patient reformers 
with experience in rural areas replaced by a bevy of Shanghai technocrats and risk-averse party 
apparatchiks. The result was a steady squeezing of entrepreneurs through more restrictive 
government regulations and tighter macro-economic policy controls which limited private access to 
credit. As a consequence of this gradual restricting of opportunity in the countryside, the rural 
population became a pool of cheap, migrant labor rather than potential entrepreneurs. Locked out of 
asset appreciation and forced to rely only on unskilled labor positions to supplement their income, 
rural residents net income growth rates plummeted both in absolute terms and relative to urban 
households. 
The end result of this statist investment bias was the rapid but hollow development of showroom 
cities, which Huang pointedly skewers in the final substantive chapter “What is Wrong with Shanghai?” 
In chart after chart, Huang successfully makes the case that the development of Shanghai into a 
world-class city that receives global praise for its infrastructure and breathtaking development has 
harmed China’s real economic growth trajectory. Huang’s list of Shanghai’s failings is long and angry: 
income levels that have failed to match the rapid ascent of per capita GDP, income inequality that has 
continually widened since the late 1980s, a private sector starved for capital, incredible corruption in 
land development and infrastructure projects, a bloated, greedy government. 
In summing up the city Huang writes “Shanghai represents the political triumph of the Latin American 
path, anchored on the prominence of statist interventions, huge urban biases, and distorted liberalism 
in favor of FDI at the expense of indigenous entrepreneurship. Shanghai, as the world’s most 
successful Potemkin metropolis, is both the sign of and the culprit for what is structurally ailing the 
Chinese economy today.”(230-231) 
As with most works on economics, it is sometimes difficult to bridge the massive gap between 
common and specialized knowledge, but aside from several paragraphs groaning with 
statistics Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics should be readable (barely) by a general audience. 
The genuine outrage at what Huang feels to be an unjust and unbalanced pattern of development 
gives the work a passion most political economy works lack, although his depiction of some well-
respected economists such as David Dollar of the World Bank can be overly harsh. Overall, the 
conclusions Huang arrives at are cogent and convincing; the 1980s were a vibrant era whose lessons 
have been ignored; China has significantly deviated from the East Asian model into a Latin American 
style economy; and although capitalism in China has deeper roots today than in the 1980s, the fruits 
of development are increasingly falling into the hands of the state or the rich. 
In the midst of this depressing account, Huang seems optimistic about China’s future. He approves of 
the policy initiatives of the Hu-Wen government although he is unsure whether their rhetoric to re-
balance and improve the livelihood of poor and rural Chinese will overcome entrenched interests. In 
this respect I think some of Huang’s optimism is misplaced. The recent Chinese economic stimulus 
package continues to favor capital intensive government industries like steel that produce prestige 
goods for the leadership–such as Olympic stadiums and potentially aircraft carriers–rather than rural 
education or healthcare. In the midst of a turbulent global economy Capitalism with Chinese 
Characteristics should, and judging by the initial response will make economists and policy makers 
pause to consider how China got into its current situation and what its proper economic objectives 
should be. 
 
